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NLRB Campaign Laboratory

Conditions Doctrine And Free
Speech Revisited
By James W. Wimberly, Jr.,*
and
Martin H. Steckel**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of free speech in union organizing campaigns has generated

a great deal of discussion and comment over the years. This subject is
naturally popular because of the intensity of a union organizing cam-

paign, the importance of the subject to industry and organized labor, the
evolution of constitutional and statutory doctrines applicable to free
speech, and the shifts in opinion by commentators and the public over
how such matters should be handled. This article will make no attempt to
summarize or analyze what has already been said on the subject. Instead,
this article will examine one aspect of National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) doctrine, the so-called "laboratory conditions" standard,' to determine its consistency with section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act$ and the
first amendment.
* Partner, Mitchell, Clarke, Pate, Anderson & Wimberly, Atlanta, Georgia. University of
Georgia (B.B.A., 1965); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 1968); Harvard Law
School (LL.M., 1969).
** Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.A., 1968); University of Georgia School of
Law (J.D., 1972).
1. The term "laboratory conditions" was first articulated by the NLRB in its decision in
General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
2. The present National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976), had its beginning with the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935).
The 1935 Act was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947,
Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 136. The Act was further amended by the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519. A
final amendment was The Act of July 26, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395. All subsequent references will be to "the Act" unless otherwise specified.
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The "laboratory conditions" doctrine is particularly worthy of scholarly
comment because of its vacillating and controversial nature. Indeed, no
NLRB campaign speech policy raises more serious statutory and constitutional issues than does this standard. Particular emphasis will be placed
in this analysis on the evolution of the Hollywood Ceramics"standard of
campaign misrepresentation, as recently reaffirmed by the Board in General Knit.' In order to have some appreciation for pertinent issues, it is
first necessary briefly to address the background of these NLRB
doctrines.
II.
A.

HISTORY OF

NLRB

REGUATION OF CAMPAIGN SPEECH

Under the Wagner Act

Prior to the Wagner Act' of 1935, there were no limitations upon what
an employer could lawfully say to his employees in a labor relations context. Thus, at that point in our history, employers could threaten union
adherents with discharge or other forms of reprisal, promise benefits or
bribes to discourage union activity, interrogate employees as to their
union views or the union views of other employees and misrepresent the
facts regarding union matters. Employers could exercise this "speech" at
any place, at any time or in any manner. It could be accompanied by
surveillance of union activities, discharges of union adherents or other
conduct designed to discourage unionism.
The situation changed dramatically after the enactment of the first National Labor Relations Act, the Wagner Act of 1935. Section 7 of the Act
afforded employees the federal right to form unions and section 8(1) provided that it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7." An amendment expressly guaranteeing freedom of
speech was rejected during Congressional consideration of the bill,7 indicating no immediate concern that the onset of this regulation would have
free speech consequences.
In the early years of the Wagner Act (1935-1941), the Board took the
position that any anti-union statement by an employer interfered with
this employees' right to organize a union. The law dramatically changed
from protecting an employer's right to say anything about a union, to
requiring that he say nothing about a union. The Board once regarded as
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Hollywood Ceramics Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 198, 49 Stat. 452 (1935)(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976)).
H.R. REP. No. 1371, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1935).
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"patently intimidatory or coercive" such statements as "[W]e don't want
no outside union to come in and run our business for us," or "[T]he union
principles are fine, but we don't want no union in our plant."' The basic
premise of the Board was that an employer had no legitimate interest as
to whether or not his employees selected a union, and that the employer's
superior economic position caused "an inherent fear of economic reprisal"
which lent great weight to his slightest suggestion.
To insulate its strict neutrality doctrine from possible first amendment
challenges, the Board asserted that every case finding employer expression in violation of the Act "occurred against a background of open manifestations of hostility to self-organization."' Surprisingly, in the early
years the Board was never forced to find an unfair labor practice on the
basis of speech alone because any speech that was the subject of litigation
always arose in the context of other unfair labor practice conduct.
Gradually, as litigation under the Wagner Act grew, cases arose involving less serious employer conduct, and the courts were forced to consider
the scope of an employer's right of free speech under the Act. By 1941
there was a conflict among the various circuit courts as to the question,
and the Supreme Court decided to address the issue in the case of NLRB
v. Virginia Electric and Power Co."
In Virginia Electric, the Board found that the posting of an anti-union
bulletin and the delivery of an anti-union speech by the employer constituted interference with the employees' right to organize. 2 Reviewing the
Board's order, the Court held that an employer is constitutionally protected in expressing his views on labor problems so long as the statements
do not amount to "coercion." Analyzing the employer's anti-union statements in the case, the Court found it "difficult to sustain a finding of
coercion with respect to them alone," but indicated that they might support such a finding if the remarks were considered as part of a coercive
"course of conduct."' Although this decision marked the end of the era
in which employers had to be neutral in union campaigns, the Court did
recognize the employer's superior economic position when it referred to
its dictum in a prior case that "[silight suggestions as to the employer's
choice . .. may have telling effect among men who know the conse8.

See Aaron, Employer Free Speech: The Search for a Policy, in PUBLIC POLICY AND
29-30 (1962).
9. See, e.g., 1 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 73-74 (1936); 2 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 64-66 (1937); 3
N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 59-62, 125 (1938).
10. Killingsworth, Employer Freedom of Speech and the NLRB, 1941 Wis. L. REV. 211,
217; see Comment, Labor Law Reform: the Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in
NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 756-759 (1979).
11. 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
12. 20 N.L.R.B. 911, 6 L.R.R.M. 42 (1940).
13. 314 U.S. at 479.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 28,
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quences of incurring that employer's strong displeasure.""
After the 1941 Virginia Electric decision but prior to the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947, the NLRB ruled that anti-union statements not patently coercive only violated the Act when they were found to be part of a coercive
course of conduct.' 5 On the other hand, the Board remained sensitive to
any circumstances which tended to be coercive in light of the employer's
superior position. In one important area in particular, the Board indicated that coercion might be created by the circumstances of a speech as
much as by its contents. In the Clark Bros. case,"6 the Board held that
the employer violated the Act by requiring that his employees attend,
during working hours, an anti-union speech which in itself might have
been constitutionally protected. The Board found this type of speech to
be inherently coercive, comparing it to the conduct of a person who physically restrains his listener and then exercises his freedom of speech. The
Second Circuit, while granting enforcement of the Board's order, did so
on other grounds and withheld approval of the "compulsory audience"
doctrine.1 7 But in the court's reasoning was the new and equally controversial doctrine that "[Ain employer has an interest in presenting his
views on labor relations-to his employees. We should hesitate to hold that
he may not do this on company time and pay, provided a similar opportunity to address them were accorded representatives of the union.""
B.

Under the Taft-Hartley Act

As part of the Taft-Hartley Act, amending the National Labor Relations Act, section 8(c) was added to the Act, stating:
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall
not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the
provisions of this Act if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or
force or promise of benefit."'
Although the legislative history of section 8(c) may not be entirely
clear, it does seem reasonably certain that the provision was intended to
overrule the Board's decision in Clark Bros. and to prevent the Board
from finding captive audience speeches to be unfair labor practices. Also,
the provision was intended to alter alleged NLRB misuse of the "course
14. International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 78 (1940).
15. See 7 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 43 (1942); 8 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 29-30 (1943); 9 N.L.R.B.
Ann. Rep. 37-38 (1944); 10 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 37 (1945); 11 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 34 (1946).
16. Clark Bros. Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 802, 18 L.R.R.M. 1360 (1946).
17. NLRB v. Clark Bros. Co., 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947).
18. Id. at 376.
19. Pub. L. No. 101, 61 Stat. 140 (1947)(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1976).
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of conduct" doctrine, that is, the tendency of the Board to hold that an
employer's speech, in itself privileged, was coercive merely because the
employer had committed some severable and unrelated unfair labor practice.10 In its Annual Report for 1948, the Board announced that section
8(c)
[a]ppears to enlarge somewhat the protection previously accorded by
the original statute and to grant immunity beyond that contemplated by
the free speech guarantees of the Constitution. For example, the Clark
Bros. "compulsory audience" doctrine has been held to be invalidated by
this section of the Act. Nor can a non-coercive speech any longer be held
to violate the act because at other times, and on other occasions, the
employer has committed other unfair labor practices. However, words
and 1conduct may be so intertwined as to be considered a single coercive
act.2

The application of section 8(c) after the 1947 amendments caused the
Board to change its analysis of employer campaign, speech. Although the
NLRB did not formally abandon its course of conduct doctrine of considering employer speech in the context of its conduct, the doctrine was
given limited, if any, application throughout the period from 1947 to
1961." However, even though an employer's free speech rights had been
expanded, two new doctrines were developed by the NLRB that served to
limit employer speech. The first development was an outgrowth of the
discarded Clark Bros. doctrine. The Board had initially concluded that
Congress had directed the Board to find the act of assembling a captive
audience to be an acceptable labor practice .2 However, it subsequently
seized upon the Second Circuit's comment in Clark Bros. that the vice of
a compulsory assembly lay in the denial of a similar opportunity for the
employees to hear the union story. Accordingly, in Bonwit Teller, Inc.,"
the Board held that although it was not an unfair labor practice for an
employer to assemble employees on company time and property for purposes of giving an anti-union speech, it was an unfair labor practice for
the employer subsequently to deny the union equal access to the same
20. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 23-24 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1947); see also Koretz, Employer Interference with Union Organization
versus Employer Free Speech, 29 Gso. WASH. L. Rgv. 399, 402-403 (1960); Comment, Labor
Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB Representation
Elections, 127 U. PA. L. R~v. 713, 761 (1979).
21. 13 N.L.R.B. Ann. Rep. 49 (1948).
22. See Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the National Labor Relations Act,
38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 243, 258-259 (1963).
23. Babcox and Wilcox Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 577, 22 L.R.R.M. 1057 (1948).
24. 96 N.L.R.B. 608, 28 L.IR.M. 1547 (1951), enforcement denied, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 905 (1953).
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2
assemblage under the same conditions.
Two years later, a change in Board membership occurred and Bonwit
Teller was abandoned. In Livingston Shirt Corp,2 6 the Board held that an
employer does not commit an unfair labor practice if he makes a preelection captive audience speech and denies a union request for an opportunity to reply, unless the employer maintains privileged or unlawfully
restrictive rules concerning union solicitation at the workplace.2 7 In so
ruling, the Board stated, "[I]f the privilege of free speech is to be given
real meaning, it cannot be qualified
by grafting upon it conditions which
8
are tantamount to negation.'
On the same day that the Board decided Livingston, it established a
new rule in Peerless Plywood Co.,' holding that neither the employer nor
the union could give captive audience speeches within the twenty-four
hour period before the election. The Board instituted the rule pursuant to
its "statutory authority and obligation to conduct elections in circumstances and under conditions which will insure employees a free and untrammelled choice. 8' 0 The policy behind the rule was to avoid creating a
mass psychology which would override arguments made through other
campaign media and would give an unfair advantage to the party who
obtains the last and most telling word. The Board considered the new
rule to be no more than an extension of its long-standing rule prohibiting
electioneering by either party at or near the polling place and similar in
purpose to another decision that set aside an election because an atmosphere of terror was created by individual employees, although the conduct could not be attributed either to the union or the employer." Although a violation of the Peerless Plywood rule would not result in an
unfair labor practice finding, a violation would cause the election to be set
aside whenever valid objections were filed.
The other doctrine developed by the NLRB that limited employer
speech subsequent to the enactment of section 8(c) was the so-called
"laboratory conditions" standard announced in General Shoe Corp."2 In
General Shoe, the employer's president brought small groups of employees to his office and read to them an anti-union address and instructed
supervisors to visit individual employee's homes to campaign against the
union. The Board found nothing improper in the content of the state-

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

96 N.L.R.B. at 615, 28 L.R.R.M. at 1550.
107 N.L.R.B. 400, 33 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1953).
Id. at 409, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1159.
Id. at 406, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
107 N.L.R.B. 427, 33 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1953).
Id. at 429, 33 L.R.R.M. at 1152.
Diamond State Poultry Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 3, 33 L.R.R.M. 1043 (1953).
77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21.L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948).
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ments but found that the method or conduct "went so far beyond the
presently accepted custom of campaigns directed at employees' reasoning
faculties that we are not justified in assuming that the election results
represented employees' own true wishes.

'3

3

The Board stated:

Conduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable a free
choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that
conduct may not constitute an unfair labor practice. An election can
serve its true purpose only if the surrounding conditions enable employees to register a free and untrammeled choice for or against a bargaining
representative."
In considering the application of section 8(c), the majority noted that
the statute by its terms applied to unfair labor practice cases. Therefore,
matters which were not available to prove a violation of law, and thus to
impose a peanlty upon a respondent, might, if extreme enough, still be
pertinent in determining whether an election satisfied the Board's own
administrative standards. The Board then articulated its "laboratory conditions" doctrine:
In election proceedings, it is the Board's function to provide a laboratory in which an experiment may be conducted, under conditions as
nearly ideal as possible, to determine the uninhibited desires of the employees. It is our duty to establish those conditions; it is also our duty to
determine when they have been fulfilled. When, in the rare extreme case,
the standard drops too low, because of our fault ...or that of others,

the requisite laboratory conditions are not present and the experiment
must be conducted over again35
Two of the five Board members dissented, strenuously arguing that in
enacting section 8(c), Congress made it abundantly clear that an employer's privileged efforts to influence its employees regarding unions
should not be restricted by the time or place of such efforts, so long as the
efforts were not accompanied by any threat of reprisal or force or promise
of benefit.8 6 The dissenters noted the paradox that, after Congress had so
strongly rejected the Board's prior construction of the statute in its relation to the constitutional guarantee of free speech, the Board should then
construe privileged expressions of opinion as creating an atmosphere
which prevented employees from freely expressing their choice in a
Board-conducted election. The dissenters concluded that if the expression of views, arguments or opinions was to be afforded the full freedom
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

127,
126,
127,
125,

21
21
21
21

L.R.R.M.
L.R.R.M.
L.R.R.M.
L.R.R.M.

at
at
at
at

1340.
1340.
1341 (citations omitted).
1341.
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which section 8(c) envisioned, then the Board could not justify setting
aside elections merely because the employer availed himself of that opportunity to express himself."1
The gist of the General Shoe "laboratory conditions" doctrine was that
the criteria applied by the Board to determine whether certain alleged
misconduct interfered with the election need not necessarily be identical
to those employed in testing whether an unfair labor practice was committed. The Board has vacillated somewhat in the strictness with which it
has applied this "laboratory conditions" standard. For example, during
the Eisenhower administration, the predominant approach was to apply
section 8(c) in the determination of both representation and unfair labor
practice cases.88 With the advent of the Kennedy administration, election
standards became more stringent and elections were set aside based on
conduct not amounting to an unfair labor practice.
C. Development of the Campaign Misrepresentation Doctrine and
Other Applications of the "LaboratoryConditions" Standard
The evolution, if not vacillation, of NLRB campaign standards is revealed in the campaign misrepresentation doctrine. As previously indicated, under the Wagner Act employers were held to so strict a standard
of neutrality that any anti-union remark constituted an unfair labor practice. Unions, on the other hand, were free to campaign, and the Board
expressly refused to probe into the truth or falsity of union campaign
materials, stating that "employees undoubtedly recognize propaganda for
what it is, and discount it."' In 1953, approximately five years after General Shoe, application of that case's principles to the misrepresentation
area culminated in the Board's United Aircraft"0 decision. In United Aircraft, one union distributed a forged telegram in which a rival union purported to apologize for its conduct during the campaign. Since the employees were deceived as to the source of the "telegram," they could not
possibly evaluate its contents. The Board accordingly set the election
aside on the basis of its section 9 authority over representation elections.4 1 No unfair labor practice findings were made, and section 8(c) was
not addressed. The United Aircraft decision was not directly concerned
37. Id. at 131, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1341 (members Reynolds and Gray, dissenting in part).
38. See Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the National Labor Relations Act,
38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 243, 261 (1963). Even the Eisenhower Board, however, acknowledged the
existence of broader authority in determining the validity of elections, as shown by its adoption of the twenty-four hour absolute ban on pre-election speeches in Peerless Plywood.
39. Corn Prod. Ref. Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1441, 1442, 15 L.R.R.M. 104, 105 (1944).
40. United Aircraft Corp., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., 103 N.L.R.B. 102, 31 L.R.R.M.
1437 (1953).
41. Id. at 105, 31 L.R.R.M. at 1438.
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with the truth or falsity of the campaign propaganda, but rather with the
deceptive manner in which the campaign representation was made.
Two years later in Gummed Products Co.,' 2 the Board took another
step and set aside an election based upon a campaign misrepresentation,
not involving a forgery, but rather false statements by a union on the eve
of the election as to the wage rates that had been negotiated between the
union and a competitor of the employer. Under the circumstances, the
Board concluded that the union's conduct "exceeded the limits of legitimate propaganda and lowered the standards of campaigning to a level
which impaired the free and untrammeled expression of choice by the
employees ... ."'Is In subsequent cases during the 1950's the rule of
Gummed Products was reaffirmed and its scope was expanded."
In 1962 the Board attempted to codify these decisions in the case of
Hollywood Ceramics." In this case the Board established its doctrine of
campaign misrepresentations as follows:
We believe that an election should be set aside only where there has
been a misrepresentation or other similar campaign trickery, which involves a substantial departure from the truth, at a time which prevents
the other party or parties from making an effective reply, so that the
misrepresentation, whether deliberate or not, may6 reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the election.'
In setting the election aside, the Board expressly indicated that one of
the factors that might disturb the required laboratory conditions was
gross misrepresentation about a material issue in the election. Thus, the
Hollywood Ceramics doctrine is really an outgrowth of the standards expressed in General Shoe.
The Hollywood Ceramics standards were severely criticized by some
commentators. Serious questions were raised regarding whether the
Board was capable of determining what kinds of statements actually have
a "substantial impact" on an election. Indeed, it was argued that the
standard itself is vague and wavering, and, therefore, has not been, and
cannot be, evenly enforced.' Although much of the criticism concerned
the resulting litigation and the opportunity to delay the obligation to bargain, perhaps the most serious criticism of the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine was an attack against its basic assumption that employee voters are

42. 112 N.L.R.B. 1092, 36 L.R.R.M. 1156 (1956).
43. Id. at 1094, 36 L.R.R.M. at 1157.
44. See Bata Shoe Co., Inc., 116 N.L.R.B. 1239, 38 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1956).
45. Hollywood Ceramics Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 221, 51 L.R.R.M. 1600 (1962).
46. Id. at 224, 51 L.R.R.M. at 1601.
47. See, e.g., Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections
under the National Labor Relations Act, 78 HARV. L. Rav. 38, 82-92 (1964).
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influenced by campaign misrepresentations and other election propaganda. This attack was most forcefully presented in a recent empirical
study by Professors Getman, Goldberg and Herman which concluded that
employees are generally inattentive to information received during representation election campaigns and are uninfluenced by it in their voting. 8
In 1977, the Board overruled Hollywood Ceramics in Shopping Kart
Food Market, Inc.4 9 and decided "no longer [to] set elections aside on the
basis of misleading campaign statements."5 The Board relied on findings
of the Getman study and on a general perception of increased employee
sophistication. Two members of the Board dissented," and a third member concurred only in that she would set elections aside when a party
makes an "egregious mistake of fact."52
The Shopping Kart case was short-lived. Less than a year later, the
two dissenters in Shopping Kart joined with a new member of the Board
in overruling Shopping Kart and readopting the standard set forth in
Hollywood Ceramics. In General Knit of California,Inc.,53 the new threemember majority insisted that there are some circumstances in which
misrepresentations may materially affect an election; and in such circumstances, the Hollywood Ceramics rule is necessary "to maintain the integrity of Board elections and thereby protect employee free choice." The
majority disagreed with the conclusions reached in the Getman study,
and explained that "the results of 43 years of conducting elections, investigating objections, and holding hearings. . . convince us that employees
are influenced by certain union and employer statements.""5 Two dissenters expressed special concern about the vagueness of the Hollywood Ceramics standards and the possibility that making objections under these
standards would lead to protracted litigation and the delay of the certification of election results."
Besides the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, there are many other applications of the Board's "laboratory conditions" standard. The Peerless
Plywood rule prohibiting campaign speeches within twenty-four hours of
the election has already been referred to, as has the rule in General Shoe
limiting an employer's tactics in urging employees to reject the union.
48. J. GETMAN, S. GOLDBERG & J. HERMAN, UNION REPRESENTATION
REALiTy (1976)(hereinafter cited as GETMAN, GOLDBERG & HERMAN).

ELECTIONS: LAW AND

49. 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
50. Id. at 1313, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1705.
51. Id. at 1315, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1709 (members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
52. Id. at 1314, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1708 (member Murphy, concurring).
53. 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978).
54. Id. at 620, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1689.
55. Id. at 621-22, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1690.
56. Id. at 624, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1692 (member Penello, dissenting); Id. at 632, 99 L.R.R.M.
at 1699 (member Murphy, dissenting).
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These policies have also vacillated over the years.5 7 Another application
of the "laboratory conditions" standard is the policy of setting aside elections in the face of inflammatory racial appeals.58 Particularly questionable is the policy expressed in several "laboratory conditions" cases in
which an employer has emphasized campaign themes such as the likelihood of strikes, plant closure and loss of jobs if the union wins the election. This policy recognizes that a coercive atmosphere may be created
even in the absence of a specific finding of objectionable conduct." This
later line of cases seems to indicate that the mere intensity of an employer's campaign caused the NLRB to set an election aside, even though
there was nothing unlawful in the employer's conduct, in the timing or
circumstances of the statements or even in the statements themselves.
III. Is THE "LABORATORY CONDITIONS"

STANDARD CONSISTENT WITH

SECTION 8(c)?
In enacting section 8(c), Congress provided that certain speech could
not constitute an unfair labor practice. Thus, the Board is correct in stating that section 8(c) is expressly limited to unfair labor practice cases.
This does not, however, lead to the conclusion that Congress intended to
allow the Board to regulate campaign speech under its section 9 authority
to conduct elections, as opposed to its section 8 authority to make findings in unfair labor practice cases. Indeed, it is likely that Congress did
not even consider the possibility that speech protected by section 8(c)
might nevertheless interfere with the holding of a fair election.
Before the enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act, the Board generally refused to set aside representation elections on the basis of employer preelection speech or conduct unless the conduct was found to be an unfair
labor practice. Thus, the standard used in determining whether an unfair
57. Compare People's Drug Stores, Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 634, 41 L.R.R.M. 1141 (1957) (employer's tactic of calling individual or small groups of employees into private areas to urge
rejection of the union constitutes election interference) with NVF Co., Hartwell Div., 210
N.L.R.B. 663, 86 L.R.R.M. 1200 (1974) (People's Drug overruled to the extent that it required a per se approach to the problem). Compare F. N. Calderwood, Inc., 124 N.L.R.B.
1211, 44 L.R.R.M. 1626 (1959) (setting aside an election in which an employer visited only
seven or eight out of thirty-seven voter employees and suggesting that the proper test is
whether the votes of those visited could alter the outcome of the election) with Excelsior
Underwear Co., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236, 1246 n.27, 61 L.R.R.M. 1217, 1221 n.27 (1966) (noting in
dictum that the Board sets aside representation elections "because an employer or his
agents called on all or a majority of employees in their homes in the period preceding the
election").
58. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 50 L.R.R.M. 1532 (1962).
59. See, e.g., Turner Shoe, Inc., 249 N.L.R.B. No. 20 (1980); Amerace Corp., ESNA Div.,
217 N.L.R.B. 850, 89 L.R.R.M. 1129 (1975); Thomas Prod. Co., Div. Thomas Indus., Inc.,
167 N.L.R.B. 732, 66 L.R.R.M. 1147 (1967).
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labor practice existed also governed the setting aside of elections." The
Board has stated that "Congress specifically limited §8(c) to the adversary proceedings involved in unfair labor practice cases and [that] it has
no application to representation cases." e However, such a conclusion appears erroneous in light of the fact that before section 8(c) was added the
standards used in determining whether employer speech was an unfair
labor practice had also governed the election process. Therefore, an equal
if not stronger argument can be made that Congress assumed that the
standards established for unfair labor practice cases would govern the
election process as well.
It is clear that many statements, such as campaign misrepresentations,
which the Board finds interfere with the "laboratory conditions" are
"views, argument, or opinion" of the kind protected by section 8(c). It is
also clear that a basic purpose of section 8(c) was to expand or at least
insure the employer's right of free speech in union campaigns. Congress
clearly was dissatisfied with the restrictive manner in which the Board
had limited employer speech under its interpretation of the Act. It is unlikely that Congress intended to allow the Board to regulate the same
employer speech under the guise of section 9 that it was expressly denying the Board the authority to regulate under section 8. A number of
commentators on the subject have concluded that the Board in its General Shoe "laboratory conditions" doctrine has disregarded Congressional
intent and improperly ignored section 8(c) in setting aside representation
elections on the basis of employer
or union speech that does not consti6
tute an unfair labor practice. 2
Upon further analysis of the issue, some applications of the General
Shoe doctrine might be sustained even if section 8(c) did apply in all
cases. For example, the Board is not regulating union or employer speech
when it sets aside an election based on third-party misconduct not attributable to the employer or the union, such as rumors spread by employees
or the community. Similarly, when the Board regulates the mechanics of
the election itself, it might set aside an election based on some impropriety unrelated to the content of employer or union speech. A strong argument might also be raised that the Board, even in light of section 8(c),
60. See Hercules Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 650, 654, 20 L.R.R.M. 1026, 1027 (1947);
M.T. Stevens & Sons, Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 229, 231, 18 L.R.R.M. 1105 (1946); see generally
Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB
Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. Rev. 755, 762 (1979).
61. Dal-Tex Optical Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1787 n.11, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489, 1492 n.11
(1962).
62. See, Comment, Labor Law Reform: The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal Access in NLRB RepresentationElections, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 712, 762, 766 n.68 (1979); Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the National Labor Relations Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv.
243, 275 (1963).
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could regulate some aspect of employer or union speech, such as the time
or place. On the other hand, when the Board sets an election aside simply
because of the content of employer or union speech that is protected by
section 8(c), it seems to be exceeding the bounds of what Congress originally intended. In these circumstances, the Board is in effect saying that
employer or union speech has somehow impaired freedom of choice; and
yet by definition such speech has not interfered with, restrained or coerced employees within the meaning of the Act. Such contradictions are
difficult to reconcile.
Another contradiction results from the view reached by most courts
that section 8(c) restates the employer's or union's rights of free speech
under the first amendment." A strong argument indeed can be made that
Congress in enacting section 8(c) intended to insure free speech rights
beyond those guaranteed under the first amendment. Otherwise, Congress
would have been doing a" 'useless' act, i.e., reinstating an existing protection."" It easily could be assumed, however, that Congress considered
that employers were not being afforded their full constitutional rights by
the NLRB, and thus section 8(c) was needed to insure this protection.
If section 8(c) does, at a minimum, guarantee first amendment rights,
then it would logically follow that neither employer nor union speech protected by section 8(c) could be penalized. Otherwise, such regulation
would be inconsistent with the first amendment. And yet, arguably, the
Board is doing just that when it sets aside an election won by an employer or union on the basis of protected speech during the election
campaign.
A similar argument was raised by the employer before the Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc." In Gissel, the employer argued that his communications to his employees were protected by the
first amendment and section 8(c), regardless of the effect of those communications on the Board's ability to insure a fair election. The Court
found the statements in question to be coercive and thus not protected by
either section 8(c) or the first amendment. Therefore, the Court did not
have to decide whether the Board could have properly set an election
aside on the basis of speech protected by section 8(c) and/or the first
amendment. The Court did state however, that
[A]n employer's free speech right to communicate his views to his em-

63. For the pertinent Circuit Court cases, see Koretz, Employer Interference with
Union Organizationversus Employer Free Speech, 29 Gso. WASH. L. Rav. 399, 412 nn.79,
80(1960).
64. See Christensen, Free Speech, Propagandaand the National Labor Labor Relations
Act, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rsv. 243, 265 (1963).
65. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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ployees is firmly established and cannot be infringed by a union or the
Board. Thus, §8(c) merely implements the First Amendment by requiring that the expression of "any views, arguments or opinion" shall not be
"evidence of any unfair labor practice," so long as such expression contains "no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit" in violation of
§8(a)(1)."

The argument that section 8(c) cannot be ignored in setting elections
aside based on the "laboratory conditions" doctrine is certainly enhanced
by this terminology.
Surprisingly, the lower courts that have considered the issue have
unanimously ruled that the Board may set elections aside under section 9
based upon employer or union speech protected by section 8(c). 67 Indeed,
so many courts have approved various aspects of the Board's "laboratory
conditions" doctrine that the question of the applicability of section 8(c)
to such cases is rarely even raised anymore.18

During 1975, the Chairman of the NLRB appointed a Task Force on
the National Labor Relations Board to review Board policies and proce-

dures. In its 1976 Intermin Report and Recommendations, the Task
Force stated:
Under the doctrine of General Shoe Corp.. .. as applied in such cases
as Sewell Mfg. Co ....
and Hollywood Ceramics . . . the exercise of
speech by a party may be the basis of a valid objection to an election, if
it violates "laboratory conditions" even though the speech does not constitute an unfair labor practice. Many objections would be precluded if
this Section 9 rule were abandoned. The Task Force considered, but does
not recommend, a proposal to eliminate as a basis for objections the exercise by a party of its Section 8(c) rights to engage in speech which is
not coercive and therefore does not constitute an unfair labor practice.6"

In addition to the various judicial pronouncements and the views of the
66. Id. at 617.
67. See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971); NLRB v.
Clearfield Cheese Co., 322 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1963); NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket, Inc.,
224 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1955), cert denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955); Sonoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB,
399 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968). For a powerful dissent see, NLRB v. Shirlington Supermarket,
Inc., 224 F.2d 649, 653 (4th Cir.) (Soper, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
Although the court in Sonoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968) found § 8(c)
to be inapplicable to "laboratory conditions" cases, it found the employer's argument to the
contrary to have "some force" and cited an example in which speech protected by § 8(c)
could lead to an unfair labor practice finding. Id. at 838.
68. For example, the courts of appeal of every circuit have unanimously approved the
Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, most without any mention or discussion of § 8(c). For the
pertinent circuit court decisions, see King, Pre-Election Conduct - Expanding Employer
Rights and Some New and Renewed Perspectives, 2 INDus. RFi.. L. J. 185, 204 n.105 (1977).
69. Id. at 205.
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Chairman's Task Force, a bill was introduced in the 83rd Congress providing for amendment of section 8(c) to extend it to election cases.70 This
bill failed to pass. Thus, although a party to an NLRB election can make
a strong argument that much of the Board's "laboratory conditions" standard is inconsistent with and thus prohibited by section 8(c), such an
argument would be met by the many case precedents to the contrary.
IV.

Is

THE LABORATORY CONDITIONS STANDARD CONSISTENT WITH THE

FIRST AMENDMENT?

There is no doubt that the Board possesses a great deal of discretion
under section 9 in regulating union elections. The Supreme Court has indicated that, "[t]he control of the election proceeding, and the determination of the steps necessary to conduct that election fairly were matters
which Congress entrusted to the Board alone.

7'

Furthermore, "Congress

has entrusted the Board with a wide degree of discretion establishing the
procedure and safeguards necessary to insure the fair and free choice of
bargaining representatives by employees." 7' In setting procedures and
policies concerning union elections, the Board may formulate policies
7
through adjudicated cases. 3
Pursuant to its section 9 authority to conduct union representation
elections and to certify their results, the Board has adopted its "laboratory conditions" standard. However, at least two members of the current
Board question the applicability of the first amendment to the doctrines
developed under this standard. The dissent in Shopping Kart74 articulated that
It is with astonishment that we note the contention that one of the
"hosts of ill effects" of Hollywood Ceramics is the "restriction of free
speech." Are our colleagues equating the Board's assessment of the impact of campaign misrepresentations on the fairness of its elections with
imposition of a prior restraint upon the parties' expression of their views,
arguments, and opinions, in any manner deemed desirable by them? The
right of free speech guaranteed by the first amendment has never been
construed to our knowledge to leave the speaker unaccountable for the
impact or effects of his speech. Similarly, a party to a Board election is
free to say what he will, but there is nothing in Section 8(c) to preclude
setting an election aside if it can be shown that serious misrepresentations or distortions of election issues have seriously impaired the fairness
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See REP. No. 1211, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
NLRB v. Waterman S. S. Corp., 309 U.S. 206, 226 (1940).
NLRB v. A. J. Tower Co., 329 U.S. 324, 330 (1946).
See generally NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1705 (1977).
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of the electoral process. The Act contains no license for unrestricted distortions and, though the Board may have the requisite authority to pare
sharply the "laboratory conditions" standard it has developed, the step
our colleagues now take cannot be justified
on the assumption that our
7
standard has restricted free speech.
The Act itself is precedent for the distinction between speech and the
effects of speech. Section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)" provides that certain publicity is
lawful provided it does not have the effect of inducing a work stoppage or
interruption of delivery services at the target establishment. Thus, while
the publicity itself may not be coercive under the statute, the publicity's
legality depends on the effect it has on those exposed to it.
The argument distinguishing speech from its effects is seriously weakened by the Board's practice of not even allowing testimony concerning
the effect of the speech on the employees' ability to participate in a free
election. 7 7 In analogous circumstances, the Supreme Court has rejected,
"any rule that requires a probe of an employee's subjective motivations as
involving an endless and unreliable inquiry. "78 Thus, it is hard to justify
the "laboratory conditions" standard on the basis that it is regulating effects and not speech.
A related argument to the nonapplicability of the first amendment to
"laboratory conditions" cases is that such proceedings are nonadversarial
and do not involve litigation, but investigation.7 9 In other words, the
Board is not condemning certain actions, but is only refusing to validate a
union election when it finds that the "laboratory conditions" were destroyed.," Although these arguments are ingenious, it is hard to believe
that they are sufficient to avoid the mandate of the first amendment. The
"laboratory conditions" standards enunciated in Hollywood Ceramics and
other cases are rules of law applicable to representation cases. 8' For purposes of the first amendment, it does not matter whether the law is being
applied in a non-adversarial setting.82
Nor can it be reasonably argued that the first amendment is not applicable because a violation of the "laboratory conditions" standards does
not result in adverse consequences to the parties. As a practical matter,
75. Id. at 1317-18, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1711-12 (members Fanning and Jenkins, dissenting).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1976).
77. See, eg., International Ladies Garment Workers Union, 214 N.L.R.B. 706, 88
L.R.R.M. 1593 (1974), enforcement denied on other grounds sub. nom. NLRB v. Georgetown Dress Corp., 537 F.2d 1239 (4th Cir. 1976) and cases cited therein.
78. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 608 (1969).
79. See Foreman & Clark, Inc. v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 396, 408 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 348
U.S. 887 (1954).
80. See Sonoco Prod. Co. v.NLRB, 399 F.2d 835, 838 (9th Cir. 1968).
81. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969).
82. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964).
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just ask an employer or union that has won a union election but then had
the election invalidated by the NLRB if it has suffered adverse consequences! As a legal matter, it would seem that the Board could not require an employer or union to go through a second election as a condition
for the exercise of constitutional rights. In another labor relations context, the Supreme Court has found that a simple requirement to register
as a condition to the exercise of the right to encourage or discourage
8
unionism is incompatible with the requirements of the first amendment. 3
The importance of the first amendment is evident in other situations.
When an election won by an employer has been set aside because of a
violation of the "laboratory conditions" standard, the employer must refuse to bargain with the winner of the subsequent election to obtain review of the adverse representation decision. However, the employer will
be found to have committed an unfair labor practice if the representation
decision is upheld. In this situation, speech protected by section 8(c) and
the first amendment will play a crucial part in the ultimate finding of an
unfair labor practice." Professor Bok, in his leading article on NLRB
union campaign regulation," discusses the issue as follows:
To be sure, the Board has responded to inflammatory appeals not by
finding them unlawful but by merely setting aside the elections in which
they occur. But one can hardly put aside the first amendment for this
reason. The critical question under that amendment is whether speech is
in fact restrained, and the Board is clearly attempting to accomplish this
result when it overturns an election and subjects the employer to another
representation campaign. Were it otherwise the Board would scarcely

trouble to intervene. Hence, the action of the Board seems plainly improper unless a case can be made that inflammatory appeals in representation campaigns are not entitled to the protection of the first

amendment."
In setting aside an election, the Board indicated in its Dal-Tex 7 decision
that "the strictures of the first amendment, to be sure, must be considered in all cases."" Thus, it must be concluded that, based on both law
83. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
84. This example comes from the court's decision in Sonoco Prod. Co. v. NLRB, 399
F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1968). The example was in the context of discussing that there was some
force to the employer's contention that the distinction between a ruling that an unfair labor
practice has been committed and a decision to set aside an election is not really meaningful
so far as the strictures of § 8(c) are concerned.
85. Bok, The Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections under the
National Labor Relations Act, 78 HAEv. L. Rzv. 38 (1964).
86. Id. at 68.
87. Dal-Tex Optical Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 50 L.R.R.M. 1489 (1962); see also Bausch &
Lomb Inc. v. NLRB, 451 F.2d 873 (2d Cir. 1971).
88. 137 N.L.R.B. at 1787 n.11, 50 L.R.R.M. at 1492 n.11.
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and reason, when the Board regulates campaign speech through its "laboratory conditions" standard, such standards are subject to the requirements of the first amendment.
As indicated earlier,89 the Supreme Court established in Virginia Electric that speeches in representation campaigns are subject to the first
amendment if no coercion is involved. The Court first recognized that
freedom of speech was a factor for consideration in the regulation of
union matters in the case of Thornhill v. Alabama.90 In Thornhill, the
Court invalidated a state statute broadly prohibiting picketing a place of
business "for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or interfering with or
injuring any lawful business or enterprise" 91 as an unconstitutional
-abridgement of freedom of speech. The Court found that dissemination of
information concerning the facts of a labor dispute was an exercise of
"speech" and therefore not open to governmental restraint absent a clear
danger of "substantive evils" arising when there was "no opportunity to
test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of
'
public opinion." "9
Later, in Thomas v. Collins,93 the Court invalidated a state requirement that union organizers register with state officials prior to soliciting
membership in a union. In declaring the statute invalid, the Court made
some extremely broad pronouncements concerning the constitutional
right of free speech in a labor relations context:
This court has recognized that "in the circumstances of our times the
dissemination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute
must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the constitution ....
Free discussion concerning the conditions
in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable
to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society."...
The right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the advantages and disadvantages of unions and joining them is protected not only
as part of free speech, but as part of free assembly."
The Court added that union campaign persuasion was under the first
amendment and "entitled to the same protection"" as the "espousal of
89. See Part II, text accompanying notes 11-14 supra.
90. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
91. Id. at 99.
92. Id. at 105. The decision designated the protection as extending to "peaceful and
truthful discussion of matters of public interest.
Id. at 104.
93. 323 U.S. 516 (1944).
94. Id. at 531 (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 538.
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any other lawful cause."" Both the majority opinion and a separate concurrence disavowed any intimation that a separate standard of speech existed for employer and union.9 Any attempt to regulate such speech
"must be justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or
remotely, but by clear and present danger." '
Thus, in the context of regulation of union solicitation, the Supreme
Court indicated that such discussion was protected by the constitutional
guarantees of both freedom of speech and freedom of assembly." The
Court rejected a mere "rational" basis for restriction, instead indicating
that a "clear and present danger" would be necessary to justify regulation. 1'" Later cases have limited the "clear and present danger" concept,
and have considered a number of factors as to whether speech can be
regulated. Some of the factors considered are the purpose of the regulation, 101 whether "non-speech" elements are combined in the same course
of conduct,10 whether speech is commercial in character, 08 or whether
regulation is merely of the time, place or manner of the speech.'"1 In the
union election campaign, there are obviously various types of rights and
interests to be considered. The employer has the right of free speech
guaranteed under section 8(c) and the first amendment. The employees
and the union have a statutory right to organize. The NLRB, likewise,
has an important interest in insuring that union representation elections
are fairly conducted. As in most first amendment cases, some sort of balancing process is necessary to determine whether the pertinent state interest justifies the restraints on speech imposed.
Since many of the "laboratory conditions" standards, such as the
Hollywood Ceramics doctrine, relate to the manner or timing of speech, it
might be argued that such regulation is a mere time, place or manner
restriction which has been approved in various Supreme Court cases.
However, these cases indicate that such restrictions must be justified
without reference to the content of the regulated speech, and may not
discriminate among speakers or ideas.108 Thus, the Board's "laboratory

96. Id.
97. Id. at 537-38, 543-44 (Douglas, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 530.
99. Id. at 531, citing Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
100. Id. at 530.
101. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
102. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
103. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
104. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
105. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 18 (1976); see generally Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976), and cases
cited therein. This is not to say that the NLRB could not regulate conduct in and around
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conditions" standards cannot be justified as merely a time, place or manner restriction.
The characterization of employer anti-union campaign speech may
have important consequences in determining the applicable constitutional
criteria. It is now well settled, for example, that "coercive" employer
speech is not protected by either section 8(c) or the first amendment.'"
Since the doctrines under discussion by definition do not involve coercive
speech, those cases involving coercive speech would not seem to provide
guidance for the issues in question. Perhaps some analogy, however, can
be made to the first amendment cases in which speech is subject to regulation in the context of "non-speech" elements. For example, the Supreme Court has recognized on several occasions that in balancing free
speech rights during a union campaign the economic dependence of the
employees on their employers must be considered. The Supreme Court
realizes that under certain circumstances the employer's slight suggestions may have telling effect among employees who know the consequences of incurring the employers' displeasure. 107 Based upon this analysis, it might be argued that when an employer is giving an anti-union
speech he is doing something more than merely talking. This argument is
analagous to the Court's recognition that a union's picket line is more
than pure speech.'" The Board itself in General Shoe tried to rationalize
that it was the employer's method of presenting its anti-union views, its
conduct, that interfered with the "laboratory conditions."
Thus, even if it is assumed that employer campaign speech goes beyond
"pure speech," that does not necessarily resolve the issues. First of all, as
Professor Bok points out,1 9 some employer speech that the Board has
found sufficient to interfere with "laboratory conditions" has nothing to
do with any economic power the employer might have over the employee.
Likewise, many of these cases are unrelated to any aspect of conduct such
as captive audience speeches or home visits. Furthermore, even if employer speech is deemed to have "non-speech" elements, a substantial
government interest would be necessary to limit such speech. The Supreme Court has stated:
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified
the polls in order to maintain order and decorum there. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966).
106. See, e.g., NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
107. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Elec.
& Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941); International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72
(1940).
108. See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
109. 78 HAsv. L. REv. at 69. (See supra note 85).
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if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 10
Therefore, even if the "non-speech" elements analysis were applicable,
the question would still remain whether the governmental interests were
sufficient to justify the restriction. It is unlikely in any event that the
"non-speech" elements analysis can appropriately be applied to employer
speech during union campaigns. The Supreme Court has indicated that
the governmental interest in such cases must not involve "suppressing
communication," and may not reduce "the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration
and the size of the audience reached."11' 1 Based upon this analysis, NLRB
limitations on employer protected speech cannot be justified as merely a
regulation of the "non-speech" elements.
Probably the major supports for the Board's regulation of protected
speech in its "laboratory conditions" cases are the various case precedents
dealing with commercial speech. Although commercial speech was at one
time not considered subject to the first amendment, it is now well settled
that commercial speech is constitutionally protected. 112 Since commercial
speech is economically motivated, it is considered more durable with less
likelihood of being chilled by proper regulation." 8 Thus, because of the
different interests involved in commercial speech, much more extensive
governmental regulation has been allowed. For example, in Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association,'' 4 the Supreme Court held that the state
constitutionally could discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients in person,
for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that the
state had a right to prevent. Such discipline did not violate constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech, even though there had been no explicit
proof or findings of actual harm or injury to the clients whom the attorney had solicited. The Court indicated that the state had a legitimate and
compelling interest in preventing those aspects of solicitation that involved fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreaching and other forms
of "vexatious conduct." In the Ohralik case, as well as other cases, the
Court has allowed extensive regulation of commercial speech under ratio110. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
111. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 17, 19 (1976).
112. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
113. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-381 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771-772 n.24 (1975).
114. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
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nale that could also serve to justify the Board's regulation of campaign

speech under its "laboratory conditions" standard.
Indeed, if NLRB regulation of noncoercive campaign speech is to be
sustained under constitutional challenge, it would seem to be necessary to
validate its regulation under rationale akin to the commercial speech doctrine. Otherwise, NLRB policies would be subject to legitimate challenge
on the grounds of overbreadth 15 or vagueness.116 The general test of
vagueness in government regulations applies with particular force in review of laws dealing with speech and mandates that the government may
regulate only with narrow specificity.1 1 7 If noncoercive employer campaign
speech is classified as commercial, an overbreadth argument would not
lie. 15 But attack against government regulation on vagueness grounds
may be appropriate even in the case of commercial speech because any
such restrictions must be narrowly drawn to serve the important governmental interest of avoiding disruption of first amendment rights.11 Although a vague statute or regulation may be cured through case adjudica-

tion,110 it is submitted that the NLRB has not so clarified its "laboratory
conditions" standards. Indeed, the Board itself has referred to aspects of
its standards as "vague and flexible." ' The vagueness of the Hollywood
Ceramics doctrine, for example, is amply demonstrated by the disagree-

ment between the Board and the courts, and even the Board itself disagrees how the doctrine should be applied.1 2 In the face of this vacilla-

tion in policy and vagueness in application, it is difficult to say that these
policies give fair notice of what noncoercive speech will be found objec115. See generally Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
116. See, e.g., Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S.
507 (1948). In the case of coercive campaign speech, the Supreme Court in Gissel rejected
the employer's vagueness argument, indicating the employer could make his views known
without engaging in "brinkmanship" when it becomes all too easy to "overstep and tumble
into the brink," and that the employer could avoid "coercive speech simply by avoiding
conscious overstatements he has reason to believe will mislead his employees." NLRB v.
Gissel Packing Co., Inc., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969).
117. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 620; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. at 108-09.
118. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977).
119. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 627 (1980);
Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. at 616-17, 620.
120. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
121. Shopping Kart Food Market, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 1311, 94 L.R.R.M. 1703 (1977);
Professor Bok has forcefully demonstrated the vagueness of various aspects of the standards. (See supra note 85).
122. See, e.g., General Knit, Inc., 239 N.L.R.B. 619, 99 L.R.R.M. 1687 (1978) (member
Penello, dissenting).
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tionable. Although the validity of such regulations might be improved by
strict construction in favor of free speech,""8 this clarification has not occurred in a manner sufficient to avoid chilling legitimate exercises of free
speech rights in union campaigns.
Whether union campaign speech can be classified as "commercial" is
subject to serious question. Several Supreme Court cases have referred to
campaign speech as "economic" and these labor cases have been cited in
the commercial speech cases."" ' Nevertheless, the Court has not gone so
far as to state that noncoercive campaign speech is necessarily
''commercial."
A strong argument might be made that noncoercive campaign speech is
either sui generis or a new variant involving economic matters as well as
the advocacy of positions on issues of public concern. In the recent case of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,'"5 the Court seemed
to recognize first amendment safeguards for activities beyond those recognized in purely commercial speech cases. The Court also required any restrictions on these actitivies to be narrowly drawn to serve legitimate interests that cannot be better served by measures less intrusive in order to
avoid any interference with first amendment freedoms. This type of analysis could appropriately be utilized in evaluating regulation of noncoercive speech in union campaigns.
Actually, to some extent the discussion of commercial speech cases is
only a 'semantic argument because it appears that the Court is really
weighing the various interests involved in the specific situation before it.
In commercial speech cases, there is less of a need to protect the speech
because it is less likely to be chilled. Most of the commercial speech cases
involve advertising which has other characteristics that lend it more readily to regulation. The conflicting interests involved in advertising cases
are not directly comparable to those involved in union organizing campaigns. In the final analysis though, the comment of Mr. Justice Black
seems particularly apropos that the test may become "whether the government has an interest in abridging the right involved and, if so, whether
that interest is of sufficient importance, in the opinion of a majority of
the Supreme Court, to justify the government's action in doing so.''
Thus far the discussion has been generic in the sense that a constitu123. See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Union, 377 U.S. 58 (1964); Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
124. See Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, (1980); Bates
v. State Bar 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 453
(1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763 n.17 (1976).
125. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
126. H. BLACK, A CONsTrruIONAL FmrTH 52 (1969).
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tional analysis has been made of the "laboratory conditions" standards as
a class. Obviously, such an analysis is totally inadequate because each of
the standards must be evaluated on its own merit. It is sufficient at this
point to conclude that the first amendment does apply to noncoercive
campaign speech and that a serious constitutional challenge might be
made to various doctrines developed under the concept of "laboratory
conditions." For example, a doctrine prohibiting campaign activity within
twenty-four hours of an election, similar to the Board's Peerless Plywood
rule, has been found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.",7 Racist
speech comparable to what the Board has disapproved of has also been
found protected by the first amendment.12 8 The Board's Hollywood Ceramics doctrine has been expressly referred to by the Supreme Court in
Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers,'2 but in dicta the Court seemed to
indicate that campaign misrepresentations are subject to protection unless they are of a deliberate or reckless nature within the meaning of New
York Times v. Sullivan.1 8 ° Thus, based on this and other Supreme Court
cases, a strong agrument can be made that the Hollywood Ceramics doctrine is overbroad in that it must be limited to malicious misrepresentations in order to stand constitutional muster.11 The Court stated in Linn:
We acknowledge that the enactment of § 8(c) manifests a congressional
intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management. And, as we stated in another context, cases involving speech are to
be considered "against the background of a profound ... commitment
to the principle that debate ... should be uninhibited, robust, and wideopen, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.". .. Such considerations likewise weigh heavily here; the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it falls
short of deliberate or reckless untruth.'
At least one circuit has recently addressed the constitutional issues in
"laboratory conditions" cases, particularly under Hollywood Ceramics,
and found such standards to be consistent with the first amendment.lu
Surprisingly, other cases have not addressed the issues in recent years.
One of the reasons is undoubtedly the fact that these cases almost always
arise in the context of coercive speech or other unfair labor practices that
are unprotected. Just as in the early years of the Wagner Act, when the
Board was never forced to find an unfair labor practice on the basis of
127.
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129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966).
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
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speech alone, ' " in recent years the courts rarely have an opportunity to
review cases involving the setting aside of an election on the basis of noncoercive campaign speech. Because only final orders are reviewable by the
courts, the setting aside of a representation election on the basis of noncoercive speech found to be violative of "laboratory conditions" would not
be subject to court review except in unusual circumstances. The cases
that address the various "laboratory conditions" standards usually arise
in other contexts, such that the constitutional issues are rarely addressed.
Finally, practitioners are discouraged from raising the constitutional
questions because of the lack of case authority questioning the doctrines
on constitutional grounds.
V.

CONCLUSION

Noncoercive campaign speech is protected by the first amendment. The
courts should not uphold the Board's "laboratory conditions" standards
without weighing and balancing the interests of the employer, the union,
the NLRB, the employees and the constitutional right of free speech. Any
restrictions imposed by the NLRB on noncoercive campaign speech must
be narrowly drawn to serve legitimate interests that cannot be better
served by measures less intrusive in order to avoid any interference with
first amendment freedoms. In balancing the various interests with freedom of speech, the balance weighs in favor of regulation insofar as campaign speech is "coercive." Although it is conceivable that some noncoercive campain speech might be subject to narrowly drawn restrictions on
the basis of the vital interests involved in conducting a fair election, it is
no answer to simply say that section 8(c) is not applicable to representation cases. To the extent that section 8(c) serves as a test of unprotected
"coercive" speech, or otherwise restates constitutional free speech guarantees, its policies should be deemed applicable to representation proceedings not involving unfair labor practice issues. Unfortunately, due to the
factual patterns in which most cases arise and the final order rule of court
review, it is rare that the courts have an opportunity to address the significant issues. In the meantime, parties to representation elections, both
employers and unions, must continue to guard their campaign speech for
fear of violating "laboratory conditions."

134.

See Part I, text accompanying notes 9-11 supra.

